A Study on the Effect of Governance Adequacy on the Corporate Performance  by Kim, Duk-Ho et al.
 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  107 ( 2013 )  59 – 66 
1877-0428 © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.




Evaluation of Learning for Performance Improvement International Conference,  
Malaysia, 25 – 26 February, 2013 
A Study on the Effect of Governance Adequacy on the 
Corporate Performance 
Duk-Ho Kima, Joongwha Kima , Yonghwan Byunb and Se-Hak Chunc* 
aGraduate School of Business Administration,  
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Dongdaemun-gu, Imun-dong 270, Seoul, Korea. 
bDivision of Management, Hallym University, Ockchundong 1, Chuncheon, Kangwondo, Korea.
cSeoul National University of Science and Technology, 172 Gongreung 2-dong, Nowon-gu, Seoul, Korea. 
Abstract 
The paper analyzes the effects of governance adequacy on the corporate performance among Korean manufacturing 
firms. Most existing governance literature have adopted agency theory and investigated the control role of 
governance structure on the basis of the stockholder perspective, testing the hypothesis that the better the governance 
structure, the lesser the agency cost and the greater the stockholders' wealth. In contrast to this hypothesis based on 
the stockholder perspective, this paper sees governance structure through the lens of stakeholders surrounding a firm's 
activities and argues that a firm's ultimate goal must be the maximization of the stakeholder value rather than the 
simple maximization of stockholders' wealth. In this paper, we focus on the governance adequacy, examining the 
relationship between governance structure's change and corporate performance. Using the multiple regression 
analysis, we find that the relationship between governance adequacy and corporate performance is statistically 
significant. In addition, when dividing the corporate governance Index into stockholders' wealth, board of directors, 
disclosure, audit committee, and dividend policy are significantly related to the corporate performance. 
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1. Introduction  
Corporate governance is a mechanism for selecting the CEO of a corporation and deciding upon how and 
where to allocate its assets, which has an influence on corporate performance. Using internal control 
devices (such as distribution of ownership shares, the board of directors and outside directors, and 
incentive system) and external control devices (such as M&A and labor market of executives); both of 
which have a decisive effect on governance structure, a corporation can minimize agency cost between 
executives and stockholders, and improve corporate performance. Shleifer (1997) asserted that the 
economic significance of corporate governance lies in ensuring that the funds invested in a corporation 
from capital market should not be used for private gain of executives, but for enhancement of corporate 
value so that the investors can retrieve the investment, and get its proper rewards. The board of directors, 
an important axis of corporate governance, acts as an intermediary to mediate the conflicting interest 
between executives and stockholders and also plays the role of reducing the agency cost. But it is true in 
South Korea that a corporation is under the essential control of a CEO as the founder or major shareholder 
so that appropriate checks have not been acted on the corporate decision-making process. The studies of 
corporate governance at home and abroad have so far tended to focus mainly on governance structure, 
which is considered to be a major factor of determining agency cost. Governance structure as conducting 
the role of a resource provider for a corporation has been neglected in the literature of corporate 
governance. However, the studies of resource dependence theory suggested that the reformed governance 
structure can lead the board of directors to provide a corporation with valuable information by enhancing 
the effectiveness of its strategic decision-making or to boost resource efficiency by reforming its role and 
can eventually improve corporate performance. The studies of these aspects of corporate governance have 
been relatively wanting in reality.  
   This paper is aimed at observing the relation between the degree of reformation of governance structure 
and corporate performance, and then at analyzing what aspect of governance structure closely influences 
corporate performance. If reformation of corporate governance is in considerable connection with 
corporate profit and corporate value, a corporation needs to reform its governance structure strategically 
and stockholders may reflect the result more in their investment decisions based on the evaluation of how 
much governance structure has been reformed. Also, various interested parties such as the government 
authorities, markets, and stockholders may request reformation of governance structure more strongly. 
2. Literature Review 
It may be said that one of the greatest changes Chaebeols or conglomerates of South Korea have gone 
through since the Asian economic crisis in 1997 is related to their governance structures. As a result, a 
wide variety of studies have been dedicated to the governance structure since 2000. From the perspective 
of the agency theory, these studies have focused on a controlling function of the board of directors, the 
corporate governance to minimize agency cost, and the causal relationship between corporate 
performance or corporate value, which has been represented in a variety of forms and governance 
structures. Most of them have dealt with the controlling roles of the board of directors, ignoring other 
kinds of roles comparatively.  
   The controversies surrounding corporate governance originate in the problem with the basic assumption 
of the agency theory, a theoretical ground of the controlling role. Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) 
pointed out that the assumptions of the agency theory (such as opportunism and pursuit of personal gain 
of executives), a theoretical basis of established studies, simplified human nature so much that the studies 
recognized humankind as a being pursuing only pecuniary profit. They indicated that the collaboration 
between a CEO and directors should be taken into account, too. Hendry (2005) found that the agency 
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theory makes a basic supposition that executives pursue private gain than profits of shareholders and may 
maximize their own utility when directors make a decision, and that the supposition includes the problem 
that it regards an executive as a thorough being pursuing only pecuniary self-interest. Still, most of 
governance studies have been conducted from the viewpoint of the agency theory, and have not dealt with 
the different functions of the board of directors.  
   Therefore, there have emerged the studies to grasp the functions of the board of directors by means of 
the stewardship theory, which explains the role of service, or the resource-dependency theory, which 
emphasizes the role as a resource provider, aside from the perspective of the agency theory. They refer to 
a series of attempts to recognize the governance structure to help corporate activities in a positive manner 
and its role as a resource provider which has been unnoticed so far, and then to look at the relation 
between this type of governance structure and corporate performance or corporate value. As part of the 
studies to grasp the functions of the board of directors, first, Muth and Donaldson (1989) elucidated board 
structure through the stewardship theory.  They stressed that the function of corporate governance was not 
limited to the controlling role and asserted that the board of directors could have an influence on 
corporate performance by presenting the CEO with situational advice and consultation. Meanwhile, 
Hillman, Cannellar and Paetzold (2000) highlighted the role of resource-providing from the viewpoint of 
resource dependency.  They further criticizing those studies on the board of directors’ function, which had 
leaned towards the agency theory. They classified directors into four categories with regard to the 
organization of the board of directors on the basis of the resource dependency theory.  They also 
examined the effects and the changed of the external environment of a corporation such as deregulation 
has on the organization of the board of directors.  In addition, an attempt has been made to explain the 
function of the board of directors in reference to the role of service. But these studies had some 
limitations. First, while Hillman, Cannellar and Paetzold (2000) made use of deregulation as a proxy 
variable for the changed external environment of a corporation, their study has a limit in that the 
deregulation, a relative concept, depends upon a researcher's opinion, and the study has not addressed the 
environment directly. Because regulation plays the role of restricting the discretion of executives in the 
process of decision-making and so may be used as a means substituting the controlling role, the 
environment of a corporation needs to be studied more directly than the proxy variable of deregulation. 
The studies concerning the role of service of the board of directors, however, are restricted to explaining 
particular issues (like rewards for a CEO) through the stewardship theory.  
   Zahra and Pearce (1989) suggested an integrated model after reviewing the existing studies about the 
relation between the board of directors and corporate performance, and they looked upon the uncertainty 
of the environment and the degree of resource availability as the important variables to influence the 
attributes of the board of directors (such as organization, characteristics, structure, and process), asserting 
that the contingencies of a corporation could have an effect on the board of directors, too. The study of 
Daily and Dalton (1993) insisted that it depended on the degree of resource availability, and whether the 
role of the board of directors succeeds or not. That is to say, the degree of resource availability has an 
influence on the role of the board of directors to provide the resource. In the study of Young, Ahlstrom, 
Bruton and Chan (2001) which compared the roles of the board of directors of corporations in Hong Kong 
and Taiwan and those in the West, the role of service and controlling is relatively less important in the 
former than in the latter, while the role of resource-providing is relatively more important in the former 
than in the latter.  
 Studies on corporate governance in South Korea revealed that the role of the board of directors has 
attracted bigger attention particularly with the introduction of the effective outside-director systems by the 
1998 regulation for listing securities.  The regulations aimed at raising corporate transparency and 
improving corporate governance after the crisis of foreign exchange. However, many of the studies in 
South Korea have emphasized only the controlling role of the board of directors for monitoring 
62   Duk-Ho Kim et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  107 ( 2013 )  59 – 66 
executives.  Hence, limited studies yet to look into how important the roles such as resource-providing 
and strategic advice are. From the necessity to approach, the role of the board of directors, this study 
observes governance structure around the role of resource-providing, and of service of corporate 
governance, and examines in a strategic manner how its improvement can have an influence on corporate 
performance.  
3. Research Methodology 
3.1. Research Model and Hypothesis 
This study examines whether the improvement of corporate governance can reinforce the role of service-
providing and of resource-providing of the board of directors, and in turn, buildup of corporate 
performance eventually. For such a purpose, Tobin’s Q, a variable of corporate performance, was used as 
an equation related to corporate performance and the year-on year degree of improvement of corporate 
governance score (CGS).  Corporate governance score be set as an independent variable to reflect the 
improvement of governance structure. The size of business, debt ratio, return on assets (ROA) and the 
others were considered as the control variables, which are recognized significant in the existing studies. A 
model and hypothesis of the positive analysis is as follows: 
 
tttttt ROAdraSizeCGQTobin HEEEEE ' 32110  
1 ' ttt CGCGCG  
 
Hypothesis 1. The degree of improvement of governance structure will have a plus effect (+) on the 
business performance of a corporation (Tobin’s Q).  
 
Another model and hypothesis of the positive analysis is presented in order to look at the relationship 
between corporate performance and the evaluation scores in reference to protection of shareholders' right, 
the board of directors, public disclosure, audit institutions, and distribution of management negligence, 
which are sub-indicators of corporate governance, as follows:  
 
ttttttttt ROASizeDIVAUDDISBODSHQTobin HEEEEEEEE  76543210  
 
Hypothesis 2-5. The optimum level of shareholders' right (H2), the board of directors (H3), public 
disclosure (H4), audit institutions (H5) will have a plus effect (+) on the business performance of 
a corporation (Tobin’s Q). 
Hypothesis 6. The distribution of management negligence will have a plus effect(+) on the business 
performance of a corporation (Tobin’s Q). 
3.2. Data 
The samples of this study are based on indexes of the corporations, whose scores of corporate governance 
had been measured for three straight years from 2005 to 2007.  This is in line with the objectives of this 
paper in examining the relationship between the optimum level of corporate governance and the business 
performance of a corporation and the relation between the improvement of corporate governance and the 
business performance of a corporation. Among these corporations, only the corporations keeping 
operating at present have been analyzed but non-manufacturing businesses are not included. The 
corporations are excluded, too, that do not offer any one of the items (such as total assets, debt, capital, 
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share outstanding, prices of common stock and preferred stock, and net profits) to estimate the variables 
necessary for hypothesis testing. As a result of that, the ultimate samples amount to 398 corporations.  
3.3. Definition and Measurement of Variables 
This study makes use of Tobin's Q to estimate the enterprise value of a dependent variable. Tobin's Q is 
the ratio between the market value of a corporation and the replacement value of its asset.  The value of 
Tobin's Q tends to rise when a corporation holds an investment opportunity to increase net present value 
or is engaged in the development with future value, or the value of intangible assets is elevated. The 
market to book ratio of a corporation has been estimated by Tobin's Q in the same way of Smith and 
Watts (1992). In other words, the market to book ratio of a corporation means the result of dividing the 
sum of the total market value of its issued shares, and the debt book value by the book value of the total 
assets. If an item does not have any one of the variables above, it is excluded.  
   In this study, the evaluation score of governance structure, an independent variable set to estimate the 
relation between governance structure and corporate performance, is the CG data measured at the 
Corporate Governance Service of Korea, which consist of five items such as protection of shareholders' 
right (68 points), the board of directors (34 points), public disclosure (32 points), audit institutions (20 
points) and distribution of management negligence (13 points), whose total score is 167 points. 
4. Results 
4.1. Analysis of Correlation among Key Variables 
Table 1. Correlation among Key Variables (2007) 
 
2007SH 2007BOD 2007DIS 2007AUD 2007DIV 䕧㻞㻜㻜㻣㻯㻳 2007q 2007dra 2007roa 2007lna 
2007SH 1 
         
2007BOD (-0.057) 1 
        
2007DIS 0.001 0.642** 1 
       
2007AUD (-0.026) 0.701** 0.572** 1 
      
2007DIV 0.019 0.003 (-0.015) (-0.073) 1 
     
䕧㻞㻜㻜㻣㻯㻳 0.091 0.320** 0.377** 0.354** (-0.019) 1 
    
2007q 0.002 0.384** 0.352** 0.321** (-0.118)* 0.248** 1 
   
2007dra (-0.123)* 0.039 -0.013 0.089 (-0.210)** 0.046 0.128* 1 
  
2007roa 0.098 0.152** 0.127* 0.078 0.170** 0.031 0.217** (-0.295)** 1 
 
2007lna (-0.067) 0.711** 0.594** 0.634** 0.034 0.259** 0.287** 0.060 0.184** 1 
* Correlation coefficients are valid in level 0.05(both sides). 
** Correlation coefficients are valid in level 0.01(both sides). 
    
   Table 1 shows Pearson correlation coefficients concerning variables used in 2007 data analysis. It was 
found that improvement of corporate governance, adequacy of board and public announcement, adequacy 
of audit committee, etc. had shown a positive correlation with Tobin's Q, and dividend policy displays a 
negative correlation with Tobin's Q. On the other hand, shareholder protection shows statistically no 
meaningful correlation in it. Statistic indicators such as size of business, debt rate and rate of return on 
asset reveal a positive correlation with Tobin's Q. According to the results, in both 2006 and 2007, the 
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dependent variable of Tobin's Q has a significant positive correlation with the degree of improvement of 
corporate governance, adequacy of board and audit committee, and adequacy of public announcement, 
and shows a negative correlation with distribution of dividends. Shareholder protection has statistically no 
valid correlation. The multicollinearity does not matter according to the results of checking the possible 
regression multicollinearity relevant to the correlation between independent and dependent variables.  
4.2. Relation between Improvement of Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance 
To verify the hypothesis 1 that improvement of corporate governance affects positively corporate 
performance (Tobin's Q), we first conduct a regression analysis. The analyses use the stepwise model, and 
include only variables that have higher explanation power among variables on dependent variables. The 
results are shown in table 2. 
   The regression analysis shows that the degree of improvement of corporate governance (ȕ=0.185, 
p<0.001) has a positive effect on corporate performance by the level of p<0.01 when the degree is 
considered as an independent variable. The R square shows that accounts for the effect of the degree of 
improvement of corporate governance on corporate performance (R square = 0.163). The F value is 
20.048 in the degree of freedom and p-value in the regression analysis is p<0.001, demonstrating the 
overall validity of this regression analysis model. Thus, the hypothesis 1 was supported that improvement 
of corporate governance have a positive effect on corporate performance. 
 
Table 2. Regression Analysis on Corporate Performance (dependent variable: Tobin's Q) 
 
Coefficient p-value 
ི2007cg: degree of improvement of 
corporate governance .185 .000 
2007dra: debt ratio .176 .000 
2007roa: rate of return on total assets .229 .000 
2007lna: log value of total assets .187 .000 
R square 0.163, F=20.048, p=0.000 
 
4.3. Connection between Corporate Performance and Other Factors 
To verify hypotheses 2-6 that other details in corporate governance will have a positive effect on 
corporate performance (Tobin's Q), we first conduct a regression analysis where shareholder protection, 
adequacy of board and audit committee, adequacy of public announcement and distribution of dividends 
are independent variables and corporate performance is an dependent variable, and then, carry out a 
regression analysis where details of corporate governance structure in 2007 are independent variables and 
corporate performance (Tobin's Q) is a dependent variable. The analyses use the stepwise model, and 
include only variables that have higher explanation power among variables on dependent variables. The 
results are in the Table 3.  
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Table 3. Regression of Corporate Governance on Firm Performance (Dependent variable: Tobin Q) 
ٻ  Coefficient P-value 
2007BOD adequacy of board and audit committee .245 .001 
2007DIS adequacy of public announcement .180 .004 
2007DIV distribution of dividends -.115 .013 
2007dra debt rate .168 .001 
2007roa rate of return on total assets .234 .000 
    
 The result of regression analysis shows that the details of governance structure such as board of 
directors, adequacy of public announcement, distribution of dividends, positively affect firm performance 
at p<0.001. R square = 0.221.  The rate of firm performance was accounted for by the board, public 
announcement, and distribution of dividends, which was at 0.221. The F value calculated was 14.836. 
Considering p<0.001 in the estimated regression analysis model, the present regression analysis model is 
statistically significant. Hypothesis 2 was supported and that the shareholder protection had positively 
affected firm performance (Tobin Q).  However, hypothesis 5 failed to support that adequacy of audit 
committee positively affects firm performance (Tobin Q). The hypotheses 3, 4, and 6 are statistically 
significant; hypothesis 3 argues positive effect of board of directors on firm performance, and hypothesis 
4 argues positive effect of public announcement on firm performance, and hypothesis 6 argues positive 
effect of distribution of dividends on firm performance. According to the result of the above regression 
analysis, reformation of corporate governance gives a positive effect on corporate performance. This is 
indicated that the board, public announcement, and distribution of dividends out of reformation factors 
positively affect firm performance. However, it appears that shareholder protection, and adequacy of 
audit committee exhibited no significant effect on firm performance. 
5. Conclusion 
 In this present paper, we empirically analyze how general modifications of corporate governance from 
2005 to 2007 have influenced firm performance. This paper shows that reformation of corporate 
governance provides positive effects on firm performance. In addition, details of adequacy of corporate 
governance such as board of directors, public announcement, and distribution of dividends are influential 
factors in corporate performance. This paper is not examined the relationship between various 
characteristics of corporate ownership structure such as managers, controlling owners and firm 
performance, the studies of which are already rich in the related literature. This paper did not verify the 
cause and effect of the relationship between the characteristics of corporate governance (board, outside 
director, bond funds, foreign investor) and firm performance, either. As for fluctuation of annual 
evaluation score of corporate governance as a reformative variable of corporate governance, we examine 
the effect of a reformative variable on firm performance. It is necessary to reform corporate governance 
as a strategic position, as reformation of corporate governance is highly related to firm profit and value. 
This paper suggests that shareholders should also evaluate positively the improvement of corporate 
governance and then incorporate the result into the investment decision making. 
 The limitation of the paper is that it is rather difficult to replicate this study in other countries because 
the data of corporate governance used in this study are scored data estimated by a professional 
organization in South Korea, and the factors of corporate governance are probably not measured in the 
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same way in other countries. Future studies must be carried out for the standardization of measurement to 
make comparative studies across different nations and industries available. 
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